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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jason Lee Burgess appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, claiming the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Officer Tim Beaudoin detained Burgess based on information that Burgess 
was in violation of his parole. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.43, L.12 - p.48, L.6.) Although 
an agent's warrant had not yet issued, Tanya Shaw, the on call duty officer, 
advised Officer Beaudoin that she would issue a warrant for a parole violation if 
Burgess was located. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.14, L.14 - p.18, L.6; p.22, Ls.11-15; 
p.44, Ls.4-8.) After Officer Beaudoin located Burgess leaving an apartment 
complex parking lot, he contacted Officer Shaw who advised him that Burgess 
could be searched pursuant to his parole agreement which contained a Fourth 
Amendment waiver. 1 (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.17, Ls.2-23; p.44, L.15 - p.45, L.3.) 
While Burgess was being detained and transported to the jail pursuant to the 
pending warrant, Officer Beaudoin requested a canine assist. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.45, L.15 - p.46, L.4.) The canine arrived within five minutes of the request and 
alerted on the exterior of the car in which Burgess had been a passenger. 
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.46, Ls.5-8.) The canine was then allowed to enter the vehicle 
where he alerted on a computer bag, which was identified by the driver as 
1 The Fourth Amendment waiver was limited to "Field and Community Services" 
(Ex. 1, p.6, ,r 8); Officer Beaudoin testified he is not considered an employee of 
that service (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.60, Ls.20-22). 
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belonging to Burgess. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.46, L.11 - p.47, L.4; p.53, L.17.) Officer 
Beaudoin apparently discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia 
inside Burgess' bag. (See Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.24, L.8 - p.25, L.1 (new parole 
violation allegations for possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia 
based on what was found during search on November 4, 2010); p.46, Ls.11-13 
(canine alerted on computer bag); Ex. 100 (Burgess booked into jail on charges 
of possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia).) 
Officer Shaw met Burgess at the jail with an agent's warrant, which she 
discussed with him. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.19, Ls.4-16.) Burgess was also booked 
into jail on the agent's warrant and for possession of methamphetamine, 
possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia based upon items 
presumably found during the search of his computer bag. (Ex. 100.) The state 
charged Burgess with possession of a controlled substance (R., pp.25-26, 28-
29), and filed an Information Part II alleging Burgess is a persistent violator (R., 
pp.92-94). 
Burgess filed a motion to suppress, claiming his arrest was illegal 
pursuant to I.C. § 20-227 because the agent's warrant had not actually issued 
when Officer Beaudoin detained him. (R., pp.47-48, 64-70.) Thus, Burgess 
argued, the drugs and paraphernalia discovered should be suppressed as illegal 
fruit of an unlawful arrest. (R., p.70.) The court conducted a hearing on Burgess' 
motion, after which it denied his request for suppression. (See generally Supp. 
Hrg. Tr.) Burgess thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of 
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methamphetamine,2 reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. (R., pp.104-112.) The court imposed a unified seven-year sentence, 
with two years fixed, and Burgess timely appealed. (R., pp.119-121, 124-126.) 
2 In exchange for Burgess' guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, 
the state agreed to dismiss the persistent violator enhancement and the charges 
alleged in a separate case, Ada County Case No. 2010-19114, which were 
consolidated with this case. (R., pp.55, 63; 3/15/2011 Tr., p.1, L.4 - p.2, L.4.) 
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ISSUES 
Burgess states the issue on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Burgess' motion to 
suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. 
Burgess following his plea of guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Burgess failed to establish the district court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress? 
2. Has Burgess failed to show the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion by imposing a unified seven year sentence, with two years fixed, upon 
Burgess' guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance in light of Burgess' 
lengthy criminal history and given that he committed the instant offense while on 
parole? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Burgess Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
A Introduction 
Burgess argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress because, he asserts, his arrest was "illegal" since the agent's warrant 
that served as the basis for his arrest was not issued until after the arrest 
occurred. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) Burgess' argument fails for at least two 
reasons. First, Officer Beaudoin did not arrest Burgess on the agent's warrant; 
rather, he detained Burgess at Officer Shaw's request and directed that Burgess 
be transported to the jail where Officer Shaw was waiting with the warrant. 
Second, even if Burgess' detention amounted to an arrest in violation of I.C. § 
20-227, any violation of the statute does not warrant suppression. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
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C. Burgess Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression 
Motion 
Burgess argues he was arrested in violation of I.C. § 20-227 because, 
although a parole officer gave verbal permission to arrest, an agent's warrant did 
not issue until after the arrest. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) Therefore, Burgess 
claims, any evidence obtained as a result of the arrest must be suppressed as 
fruit of the poisonous tree. (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Burgess' claim fails for at 
least two reasons. 
First, Officer Beaudoin testified he detained Burgess at Officer Shaw's 
request. Idaho Code§ 20-227 does not prohibit such a detention. Rather, I.C. § 
20-227 only addresses the circumstances under which an officer, other than a 
parole or probation officer, may arrest a parolee. Section (1) of that statute 
reads: 
Any parole or probation officer may arrest a parolee, probationer, or 
person under drug court or mental health court supervision without 
a warrant, or may deputize any other officer with power of arrest to 
do so, by giving such officer a written statement hereafter referred 
to as an agent's warrant, setting forth that the parolee, probationer, 
or person under drug court or mental health court supervision has, 
in the judgment of said parole or probation officer, violated the 
conditions of drug court or mental health court or conditions of his 
probation or parole. 
I.C. § 20-227(1 ). 
Although Officer Shaw used the word "arrest" in articulating her directive 
to Officer Beaudoin (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.17, Ls.6-11), Officer Beaudoin testified he 
detained Burgess and advised him "that probation and parole was going to issue 
an agent's warrant on him" (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.55, L.17 - p.56, L.1 ). Officer 
Beaudoin's characterization of the encounter as a detention rather than an arrest 
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is the most accurate given that no agent's warrant existed on which to arrest 
Burgess when Officer Beaudoin made contact with him. The question, therefore, 
is whether it was constitutionally permissible for Officer Beaudoin to detain 
Burgess and have him transported to the jail so Officer Shaw could effectuate an 
arrest pursuant to I.C. § 20-227. The state submits that it was. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that probationers and 
parolees, due to their status as such, have a diminished expectation of privacy 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 
(2001 ). The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this same diminished expectation 
or privacy in State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987), 
stating: "persons conditionally released to societies have a reduced expectation 
of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities 'reasonable' 
which otherwise would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional constitutional 
concepts." Applying this principle to Officer Beaudoin's detention of Burgess 
supports the conclusion that the detention was not unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court's opinion in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), is 
instructive. 
In Samson, the Court "granted certiorari to decide whether a suspicionless 
search, conducted under the authority [of a statute authorizing a search without a 
warrant or probable cause], violates the Constitution." 547 U.S. at 846. The 
Court held "it does not." & In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted its prior 
conclusion in Knights that probationers and parolees have a diminished 
expectation of privacy. kl at 847-849. The Court reasoned: 
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As we noted in Knights, parolees are on the "continuum" of 
state-imposed punishments. On this continuum, parolees have 
fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is 
more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment. As 
this Court has pointed out, parole is an established variation on 
imprisonment of convicted criminals .... The essence of parole is 
release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the 
condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance 
of the sentence. In most cases, the State is willing to extend parole 
only because it is able to condition it upon compliance with certain 
requirements . 
. . . The extent and reach of [California's] parole conditions clearly 
demonstrate that parolees . . . have severely diminished 
expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone. 
547 U.S. at 850 (citations and quotations omitted). 
Based upon a parolee's reduced expectation of privacy and the state's 
interests in the ability to regulate those released on parole, the Court in Samson 
concluded that "[i]mposing a reasonable suspicion requirement" on the ability to 
search a parolee "would give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate searches 
and conceal criminality." Samson, 547 U.S. at 854. Accordingly, the Court held 
"that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a 
suspicionless search of a parolee." ~ at 856. 
Although Samson involved actions taken pursuant to a statute that 
permitted suspicionless searches, the holding of the case stands for the broader 
proposition that such searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 547 U.S. 
at 856. It logically follows from this holding that Officer Beaudoin could do 
precisely what he did in this case without running afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment, i.e., detain and even search Burgess, who was on parole, without 
any suspicion whatsoever. Indeed, Officer Beaudoin exceeded this minimum 
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standard by virtue of his knowledge that Burgess was in violation of his parole, 
thereby providing a reasonable basis, if not a "reasonable suspicion," for 
detaining Burgess.3 
Even if this Court concludes Officer Beaudoin's detention of Burgess 
constituted an arrest in violation of I.C. § 20-227, Burgess is not entitled to 
suppression as a result because a violation of a state statute does not compel 
the Fourth Amendment remedy of exclusion. In Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 
166 (2008), the Supreme Court "consider[ed] whether a police officer violates the 
Fourth Amendment by making an arrest based on probable cause but prohibited 
by state law." The Court concluded such an arrest does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, reasoning: 
The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable 
searches and seizures" of (among other things) the person. In 
determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin 
with history. We look to statutes and common law of the founding 
era to determine the norms that the Fourth Amendment was meant 
to preserve. 
We are aware of no historical indication that those who 
ratified the Fourth Amendment understood it as a redundant 
guarantee of whatever limits on search and seizure legislatures 
might have enacted. The immediate object of the Fourth 
Amendment was to prohibit the general warrants and writs of 
assistance that English judges had employed against the colonists. 
That suggests, if anything, that founding-era citizens were skeptical 
of using the rules for search and seizure set by government actors 
as the index of reasonableness. 
Moore, 553 U.S. at 168 (citations and footnote omitted). Stated another way, "it 
is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law. That 
\ 
3 Reasonable suspicion Burgess was in violation of his parole also provided 
justification for the search independent of the detention. Samson, 547 U.S. at 
854. 
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Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a 
constitutionally permissible arrest." kl at 178. The Idaho Supreme Court 
recognized this same principle in State v. Bicknell, 140 Idaho 201, 204, 91 P.3d 
1105, 1108 (2004), when it concluded the "exclusionary rule is not an appropriate 
sanction for" procedural error in the issuance of warrants in light of the 
"substantial social cost" it exacts. Cf. State v. Zueger, 143 Idaho 647, 650, 152 
P.3d 8, 11 (2006) (holding that procedural defect resulting from judge authorizing 
prosecutor to sign warrant on her behalf did not result in a constitutional 
violation); State v. Curry, 103 Idaho 332, 336-337, 647 P.2d 788, 792-793 (Ct. 
App. 1982) (warrant's failure to fully comply with I.C.R. 41 (c) did not require 
exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to warrant because lack of compliance 
went to ministerial procedural requirements and exclusion of evidence requires a 
showing of prejudice by the defendant). 
Although Moore was premised on a finding that the arrest was based on 
probable cause that a crime had been committed, as opposed to a determination 
that the defendant violated his parole, its rationale applies to the facts of this 
case. If the Fourth Amendment is not intended to enforce state law governing 
when an officer can arrest, it is surely not intended to enforce state law governing 
arrests for parole violations, particularly where such arrests are based upon 
information equivalent to the probable cause standard.4 Moreover, Burgess has 
4 Although Burgess cites both the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho Constitution 
on appeal (Appellant's Brief, p.6), he cited neither in support of his motion to 
suppress or supporting brief filed in the district court (R., pp.47-48, 64-70). At 
best, Burgess only relied on the Fourth Amendment in support of his claim that 
he was entitled to suppression. (See Supp. Tr., p.76, Ls.5-7 (discussing 
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failed to show the exclusionary rule is an appropriate sanction where, as here, 
none of his substantive rights were impacted as a result of any detention 
performed at the request of the on call parole officer. Bicknell, 140 Idaho at 205, 
91 P .3d at 1109 (because defendants failed to "show how the alleged procedural 
error in the issuance of the search warrant here in any way impacted any of their 
substantive rights ... such error affords no basis for suppressing the evidence 
obtained during the search pursuant to the warrant"). 
Because Burgess' detention was constitutionally permissible, he has failed 
to show he is entitled to suppression of any evidence found subsequent to his 
detention. Even if this Court finds Burgess was arrested in violation of I.C. § 20-
227, because suppression is not an appropriate remedy for such a violation, 
Burgess has failed to establish error in the denial of his motion to suppress. 
11. 
Burgess Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Burgess asserts his sentence is excessive because, he argues, "the 
district court failed to give proper consideration to his admitted substance abuse 
problem and desire for treatment." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Burgess has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion given the objectives of sentencing, his 
limitations on Fourth Amendment waiver as term of parole).) Regardless, 
Burgess has failed to articulate any basis for concluding that the Idaho 
Constitution affords greater protections (or remedies) for constitutional violations. 
Moreover, the state submits that exclusion would not be the proper remedy even 
if the Court finds a violation of I.C. § 20-227 in this case. State v. Fees, 140 
Idaho 81, 3d 306 (2004). 
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criminal history, and the fact that he was on parole when he committed the 
instant offense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion, Burgess must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, 
the sentence was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives 
are: "(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). 
Burgess cannot meet his burden in this case. 
In support of his excessive sentence claim, Burgess argues the district 
court "failed to give proper consideration to his admitted substance abuse 
problem and desire for treatment." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Prior to imposing 
sentence, the district court noted it received the presentence materials including 
those "regarding The Walker Center treatment facility" and that it reviewed the 
"voluminous materials" submitted. (Sent. Tr., p.16, Ls.19-23, p.34, Ls.4-9.) Of 
note to the court was the fact that Burgess had "been through ... virtually every 
treatment program our system has to offer" without long-term success. (Sent. 
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Tr., p.35, Ls.15-18.) Given that track record and Burgess' prior record, the court 
concluded a seven-year sentence with two years fixed was appropriate. (Sent. 
Tr., p.35, Ls.19-24.) Burgess' history supports the district court's conclusion. 
Burgess' arrest for possession of methamphetamine in this case occurred 
less than eight months after he was placed on parole in two other felony cases -
one involving convictions for felony eluding, unlawful possession of a firearm, 
and possession of a controlled substance, and the other involving a conviction for 
grand theft. (See Exhibit 1, p.5 (parole agreement).) Before Burgess was 
convicted of those crimes in 2007, he already had a lengthy criminal history 
including three convictions for possession of a controlled substance and was 
incarcerated from April 10, 2001, to October 11, 2005. (PSI, pp.1, 48, 62-64, 83-
85.5) Within ten months of his release in October 2005, Burgess was arrested. 
Although Burgess wanted the court to elevate his rehabilitation above all 
other sentencing objectives (see generally Sent. Tr., pp.20-33), and assuming an 
emphasis on rehabilitation translates into a lower sentence, the court did not 
abuse its discretion by failing to do so given that Burgess has claimed 
commitment to sobriety in the past, only to fail to follow through with that 
commitment (PSI, p.7). Indeed, it was entirely appropriate for the district court to 
express skepticism toward Burgess' renewed commitment to sobriety. (Sent. Tr., 
p.36, Ls.2-4 ("Mr. Burgess, one of the things that troubles me is I don't know 
whether you've really found it or whether you are a world-class manipulator.").) 
5 
"PSI" refers to the information contained on the electronic file entitled 
"BURGESS PSI H0700129.H0601464.pdf' and the page numbers are those 
appearing on the documents contained in that file. 
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This is particularly true given that Burgess has been afforded numerous 
opportunities for treatment and rehabilitation (PSI, p.8), to no avail. 
Burgess' belief that the court should have given his "substance abuse 
problem and desire for treatment" greater weight does not establish an abuse of 
discretion. Burgess' claim that other factors, such as his depression, post-
traumatic stress disorder, family support, and acceptance of responsibility, also 
warrant a lesser sentence likewise fails to establish an abuse of discretion in light 
of Burgess' repeated criminal offending and his failure to demonstrate he can live 
in the community and conform his conduct to the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Burgess' conviction 
and sentence. 
DATED this 21 st day of December, 2011. 
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